Abstract
Introduction
According to the most recent data collected by the Portuguese central bank (Banco de Portugal), more than 10 million debit cards and almost 8.5 million credit cards were in use in Portugal (pop. 10 million) in the year 2010 1 . During that same year, 1.6 billion transactions, amounting to over 86.5 billion euros, were made with these cards in Portugal and abroad 2 .
These numbers, magnified by extension in the EU and around the world, reveal the significance of electronic payment, making it a subject worthy of academic attention. The focus of this paper will be to expose flaws in European legislation that result from a deficient understanding of the contractual structure that is the basis of electronic payment.
The contractual structure behind a card payment
Both the card agreement, signed between a cardholder and his bank, and the merchant agreement, signed between a supplier and his bank, play a major role in defining the parameters of credit and debit card use. The fact that these master contracts plan in advance, globally, future transactions between the parties warrants simpler and faster "application contacts" between them, which provokes the standardisation of these contracts. The parties' conduct, rights, and duties in future contracts, including every fee, price or cost generated by electronic payment, are agreed upon in advance with the signing of the first contract 3 .
The existence of a single debit or credit card contract is not enough, however, to make an electronic payment. Each time the cardholder asks his bank to pay a certain amount of money on his behalf to a third party, a specific authorisation of the transaction by the bank is necessary to complete the transaction. In other words, an electronic payment demands two distinct moments in which the parties exchange a matching offer and acceptance. When the initial framework or master contract is made, the payment beneficiaries and the amounts to be paid by the bank are still unknown. Only when the "application contracts" (i.e., sales of goods, contracts for services) are made with third parties (the suppliers) and the cardholder gives an order (or a mandate) to pay to the issuer is the electronic payment executed.
A contractual mechanism that allows the parties to fragment the same economic transaction in two separate agreements is crucial in cashless and long distance payment systems. The first agreement is carefully and exhaustively planned, even if only by one of the parties, unilaterally,
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Maria Raquel Guimarães 5 in advance and thinking on a large group of potential costumers, using standard clauses. A second agreement is formed through several automatic gestures with the help of an ATM or POS terminal. Additionally, the technique of formulating a skeleton contract allows for the consummation of subsequent "second degree" or "application" contracts, virtually ad aeternum, without further negotiations. This type of contractual scheme that is the foundation of a card payment is known as a framework or master contract 4 .
To recognise the card agreement as a master or framework contract implies that this agreement is considered as a legally binding agreement and not merely as a preliminary or preparatory agreement reached during the negotiation process. Also the orders given to the bank by the cardholder are taken as contracts, as mandates to pay, even if made in a sui generis way, through the exchange of electronic messages in computer terminals, and not purely as the performance of a previous contract.
The card agreement is an internal or bilateral framework contract 5 in that it prepares the contracts to be made by the exactly same parties in the future (the mandates for the payment of certain sums given by the cardholder to the issuer). However, it is also an external or unilateral framework contract because it anticipates the future transactions between the cardholder and the suppliers from whom he purchases goods or acquires services. The same is true for the merchant agreements. The contracts between the cardholder and the dealers are "application contracts", contracts that develop the initial framework contract, as are the mandates given by the 4 See, in the UK, GOODE (1995), pp. 79-80 (note 37) and STEPHENSON (1993), pp. 24-25; in Germany, LARENZ and WOLF (2004 ), p. 428, §113, KIENHOLZ (2000 ), pp. 28-29 and SCHWINTOWSKI and SCHÄFER (2004 in Italy, SPINELLI and GENTILE (1991), pp. 395, 397-398; in Spain, BATUECAS CALETRIO (2005) , p. 233 (note 108) -despite defending the thesis of the "normative contract"-and RIVERO ALEMÁN (2002), pp. 537, 546; in Portugal, GUIMARÃES (2011), pp. 541-572 . Not too far away from this conception, defending the card contract as a "normative contract", see, in Spain, BATUECAS CALETRIO (2005 ), p. 186 et seq., GETE-ALONSO Y CALERA (1997 ), pp. 157-158, CHULIÁ VICENT and BELTRÁN ALANDETE (1999 ), p. 141, NÚÑEZ LOZANO (1997 ), p. 98 et seq. and VICENT CHULIÁ (1990 See GUIMARÃES (2011), pp. 570-572. The distinction between internal and external master contracts is inspired on the same distinction made traditionally by Italian and German doctrine concerning normative contracts. For further developments on internal/external normative contracts, see, for all, GUGLIELMETTI (1969), pp. 48-51, and MESSINEO (1962) Several credit agreements are, nevertheless, excluded in these laws based on the nature of the consumer, the amount of credit ("less than 200 euros or more than 75,000 euros"), the absence of interests or other charges, or the time period given for repayment ("within three months") 12 .
These criteria are difficult to apply to credit card agreements, leading to an impossible conclusion about the inclusion of a specific credit card contract in consumer credit provisions.
is made, it is impossible to determine if the transactions will reach the credit range delineated by the directives. Finally, if the contract is not written down or some important information is missing while the cardholder has yet to use his card, is the contract valid? How do we know if the cardholder is a consumer if he has not yet used the card (either for business or personal use 14 )? How can compliance with European legislation or national laws be judged in the moment the contract is signed? In that particular moment, the amounts that will be paid with the card and the repayment options selected by the cardholder are not yet known. Even the ultimate decision of using the card has not been made.
The necessity to legislate the parameters of credit card contracts prior to effective card transactions was not taken in account by the European legislator nor by national legislators when transposing the directive on consumer credit agreements. A corrective interpretation of the law must be made to comply with consumer credit directives. For a credit card agreement to be included in consumer credit provisions it should be enough that the credit card agreement allows for payment to be postponed for more than three months with fixed interest or other charges and for the cardholder to utilise the card for personal use. The consumer's credit limit must stay between the values fixed by law despite the repayment options chosen by the cardholder at the end of each month and the exact value of each card transaction 15 .
The consumer credit directives and the subsequent national laws have been constructed on the basis of a credit agreement that results in a single deal.
The consumer credit legislators did not take into account the conclusion of a master long-term agreement that contains the complete program of credit card transactions-except for the when, how much, and to whom the payment should be made. And they did not take into account the legal fragmentation of the transactions into different contracts of consecutive single mandates to pay. This is true despite Directive 2008/48/EC admitting the existence of a "linked credit agreement", understood as an agreement that "serves exclusively to finance on agreement for the supply of specific goods or the provision of a specific service". This condition is not met by credit cards as they serve to finance a large group of undefined transactions to be made with unknown suppliers 16 . One credit agreement per contract for the supply of goods or services is the type of linked operation the legal text intends to address. This same concept was expressed implicitly in Directive 87/102/EEC by demanding different conditions for the linked contracts, i.e., the exclusivity of the grantor of credit when making credit available to customers of a certain supplier 17
14 See art. 3, point (a).
. This demand, however, is only met by the mandate given by the cardholder to the issuer to pay this supplier. However, this second agreement, the mandate to pay, is not the credit 15 See GUIMARÃES (2011), pp. 239-249. 16 See art. 3, point (n) (i), (ii). Extensive doctrine has taken position over the years about the inclusion of credit card payments on the linked transactions mentioned on art. 11 of Directive 87/102/EEC and on internal national laws. The condition that the grantor of the credit and the supplier of the goods or services have a pre-existing agreement whereunder credit is made available exclusively by the former to the supplier's clients hardly can be verified on a credit card transaction as it has been pointed out by most authors 19 . The consumer, in credit card transactions, obtains his credit pursuant to the master contract made with his bank and not to a pre-existing agreement between the supplier and the bank. On the other hand, only in very particular cases a certain bank makes credit available exclusively to customers of a supplier.
The credit card transaction and the subsequent mandate to pay not only implies a pre-existing agreement between the cardholder and its issuer but is also one of a larger group (more or less vast, depending on the holder's consuming habits) of consecutive transactions, identically performed but with different amounts and with different suppliers. In other words, the credit card agreement is a framework contract that has not been taken into account by the consumer credit Directives.
The credit card framework contract and distance contracts
The payment by card in distance contracts was addressed specifically admitted by art. 8 of Directive 97/7/EC 20 . According to this provision:
"Member Sates shall ensure that appropriate measures exist to allow a consumer: to request cancellation of a payment where fraudulent use has been made of his payment card in connection with distance contracts covered by this Directive, in the event of fraudulent use, to be recredited with the sums paid or have them returned".
Despite the validity of the possibility to request the cancelation of a fraudulent payment granted by the 1997 Directive, this request could not be made by the cardholder. According to art. 8, this right was given to the consumer, defined as a "natural person who, in contracts covered by this 18 See GUIMARÃES (2011), pp. 457-491. 19 In Spain, see CASTILLA CUBILLAS (2010) Once again, European legislation has failed to recognise the difference between the master card agreement and the single transaction during which the card was used. The party that concluded the first contract, the cardholder, is not, in these fraudulent transactions, the same person that acted in the distance contract. Giving the right to request the cancellation of a fraudulent payment to the person that acted fraudulently in the distance contract is the result of a misunderstanding of the card's contractual complexity.
However, this provision on "payment by card" included in the 1997 distance contracts directive, as was already mentioned, was replaced in 2007 by Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services, and so have national provisions on the same matter been replaced by the respective payment services laws.
The credit card framework contract and Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services
Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services in the internal market 23 Accordingly to the payment services directive: has introduced the "framework contract" concept into payment services. Consequently, the "framework contract" concept was also introduced in national laws on payment services. The European legislator has adopted the expression "framework contract" in the English version of the Directive. This is a direct translation of the German "Rahmenvertrag" and the French "contrat-cadre" and is known in Portugal and Spain as "contrato-quadro" and "contrato marco", respectively. These terms are used extensively in the legal texts and doctrine of European countries but with less frequency in Anglo-American legal literature, where expressions like master contract or master agreement are more commonly used 24 .
This directive has also defined, in detail, the rules "(...) concerning transparency of conditions and information requirements for payment services, and the respective rights and obligations of payment service users and payment service providers in relation to the provision of payment services as a regular occupation or business activity" [art. 1(2)].
Debit and credit card payments are "payment instruments" 25 and are therefore included in the directive provisions. This directive has adopted previous solutions to debit and credit card payments already tested by former commission recommendations in 1987, 1988 and 1997 . At the same time, it has significantly increased cardholder protection and established a single, uniform, and more complete and certain legal framework.
-The principles of transparency and gratuity of the information provided by the payment service provider (art. 30 to art. 32) are expressly set out and is also established that Member States may stipulate that the burden of proof of the compliance with the information requirements shall lie with the payment service provider (art. 33).
-Any changes in the framework contract must be proposed by the provider no later than two months before their application [art. 44(1)], two times the period specified by Commission Recommendation 97/489/EC concerning transactions by electronic payment instruments and in particular the relationship between issuer and holder 26 .
-The payment instrument user shall use it in accordance with the terms settled in the framework contract and shall "take all reasonable steps to keep its personalised security features safe". Consequently, he must "notify the payment service provider, or the entity specified by the latter, without undue delay on becoming aware of loss, theft or misappropriation of the payment instrument or of its unauthorised use" (art. 56).
-The payment service provider has to make sure that "the personalised security features of the payment instrument are not accessible to parties other than the payment service user entitled to use the payment instrument", and he must "refrain from sending an unsolicited payment instrument".
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It is also said that the payment service provider is the one who bears "the risk of sending a payment instrument to the payer or of sending any personalised security features of it". Finally, he must prevent all use of the payment instrument once notification of loss, theft or misappropriation of the payment instrument or of its unauthorised use has been made by the user (art. 57).
-PSD also establishes the irrevocability of a payment order once it has been received by the payer's payment service provider (art. 66), which means that the payer cannot "change his opinion" on the agreement made with a third party by revoking the payment order, namely on the basis of the counterparty noncompliance -except in the cases the law gives him the right to withdraw from the agreement 27 .
Concerning the contractual complex that supports a payment transaction, Directive 2007/64/EC has clearly specified the information that must be provided to a payment service user before and after ordering a single payment transaction not covered by a framework contract (art. 35 to art. 38) both before a framework payment contract is concluded (art. 40 to art. 43) and after a individual payment transaction covered by the framework contract is ordered (art. 47). The information demanded of the payment service provider before a framework contract is concluded is much more detailed than when a single operation (not covered by a framework contract) is involved.
Significantly, derogations from information requirements for low-value payment instruments are established by the directive. The European legislator has identified "low-value payment instruments" according to the framework contract as payment instruments that include only individual payment transactions that do not exceed 30 euros or that have a spending limit of 150 euros 28 . This text is clearly a step forward from the derogations from consumer credit's Directive [art. 2(2), Directive 2008/48/EC]. The reference to the framework contract that identifies excluded operations before they are actually made, avoids the problems of interpretation that arise from consumer credit directives.
However, Directive 2007/64/CE establishes the necessity of the payer's consent to execute a payment transaction 29 . In other words, the first (general) consent, given on the framework contract, is not enough to authorise a payment transaction. A single consent given by the payer is required to execute each payment operation. The payer must express his consent not only to the master contract made with his bank but also to every single payment order given to the bank.
The payment service provider, in turn, "shall not refuse to execute an authorised payment order...in cases where all the conditions set out in the payer's framework contract are met" 30 . 27 See art. 14, Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers. 28 Or store funds that do not exceed 150 euros at any time: art. 34(1), Directive 2007/64/EC.
29 Idem, art. 54(1)(2).
InDret 2/2012
Maria Raquel Guimarães
13
Consequently, whenever he refuses to execute a payment order, "the refusal and, if possible, the reasons for it and the procedure for correcting any factual mistakes that led to the refusal shall be notified to the payment service user" 31 . Despite the obligation to perform the orders given by his client that emerge from this disposition, the 2007 directive establishes the possibility to refuse to execute a payment order in cases where the conditions set out in the framework contract are not all met. In other words, every time the payment service provider receives a payment order given by the service user he must verify the compliance of all the conditions set out in the framework contract, even electronically, before deciding to execute that order. The fact that he is urged to agree again with every payment ordered by his client is an indication that the payments are considered several different contracts linked by a first preparatory master contract.
Nevertheless, PSD has not taken the step forward to identify single payment orders given by a payment service user as independent contracts rather than compliance acts of a previous contract. It is also true, however, that such an analysis largely exceeds the mission assigned to the legislator.
However, it should be within the European legislator's authority to distinguish the master agreement and the subsequent mandates when an unauthorised payment order is given by a third party. The confusion regarding the two operations did not allow for the legislator to maintain the necessary separation already traced in the matter of information requirements:
According to art. 60(1) on payment service provider's liability in the case of an unauthorised payment transaction, "the payer's payment service provider refunds to the payer immediately the amount of the unauthorised payment transaction". However, as has previously occurred with the "consumer" in Directive 97/7/EC, in the PSD the "payer" is "(...) a natural or legal person who holds a payment account and allows a payment order from that payment account (...)" [art. 4(7)].
As stated above, a person cannot allow a payment order and, at the same time, be the "victim" of an unauthorised payment ordered fraudulently by an unknown person. The PSD has again confused the parties in the framework contract with the parties on the mandate to pay when a payment order is given by an unauthorised person. Obviously, it is the counterparty of the payment service provider in the framework contract that must be immediately refunded the amount of the unauthorised payment. Is the person named in art. 59 the "payment service user [who] denies having authorised an executed payment transaction", erroneously referred to as "the payer" on art. 60.
The same confusion has affected national laws on payment systems. In Spain, art. The problem here is the question of who bears the losses relating to unauthorised orders made by a third person that has found or stolen a payment instrument, namely a payment card, or has anyhow used a misappropriated a payment instrument. Should the payment system user or the payment system provider bear those losses? In these cases, the PSD has distributed the losses between the parties in the payment framework contract, taking into account the moment the notification of the loss, theft or misappropriation of the payment instrument takes place as well as the degree of negligence of the user. Clearly, the legislator didn´t want to name on art. 61 the unknown person who ordered a payment from someone else's account using a misappropriated instrument, the person who was a party, with the bank, on the mandate to pay 32 , as he effectively has performed, but the "purported payer" instead 33 .
32 Authors like STEENNOT (2008) had no doubts when interpreting these PSD provisions in the sense that the European legislator has distributed liability for unauthorized operations between the user and the provider of the payment services (see 2.2.). Nevertheless in any occasion the author makes a reference to the PSD text and to the payer there mentioned, as it is defined on art. 4(7). Also LÓPEZ JIMÉNEZ (2011), p. 576, commenting on art. 31 of Spanish LSP, uses, apparently indistinctly, the terms payer (ordenante) -adopted by the LSP-, user (usuario) and user-payer (usuario ordenante), leaving no doubts that's the user of the payment service who is entitled to the immediate refund but without making any critical remark to the law's text. The same acritical mentions to the payer happen with the author comments on art. 32 LSP (pp. 598-602).
33 Curiously, the reference to the "purported payer" is made by a Canadian author, GEVA (2008 GEVA ( -2009 , when making a comparative analysis between the PSD and the U.S. legislation on payment transactions. GEVA points out, wisely, that "the reference in Article 61(1) to the "payer" should have been to the "purported In summary, in 2007, the European legislator adopted the previous solution that was in place ten years previously on Directive 97/7/EC and, in doing so, did not distinguish the different contractual levels involved in electronic payment transactions. The same fate was dictated to national laws in different European countries. Despite having separated the framework contract from the subsequent payment orders, the 2007 directive has not clarified that it is the payment service user who is entitled to an immediate refund of an unauthorised payment. However, this is the only possible interpretation of the law. The service provider does not comply with the framework contract when he executes an unauthorised payment order. At the same time, the payment service user must bear the losses relating to these fraudulent orders by failing to fulfil his obligations set out in the framework contract.
Final remarks
The importance of the "contractual embroidery" of payment card transactions is not merely academic; its complete comprehension is essential for effective legal solutions. In fact, the lack of understanding of this contractual duality has led to several problematic clauses found in the European directives and in national laws that require corrective interpretations.
The existence of a second agreement between the consumer and issuer, in addition to the master contract, is revealed in the renewal of their declarations with each payment transaction. The master long-term card agreement contains the mandate for single payment but lacks the details concerning when, how much, and to whom the payment should be made. This master or framework contract, to use PSD language, is not itself a simple mandate to pay. This first contract is a much more complex mechanism known in German literature as a Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag 34 . This contract fulfils several different interests of the parties, including the possibility for a "last resource" credit facility for credit card users, even if the holder never really uses it.
The desire to order a cashless electronic transaction, eventually associated with a deferred payment facility, is only verified through the performance of a single card operation and not before. As far as the master contract is concerned, the subsequent card transactions are merely eventual. However, the promise to pay accepted by the card issuer upon signing the master contract is revaluated every time a payment is solicited. While these mandates to pay are unique in that they are exchanged electronically, it should not change the essence of the agreement.
payer" because he did not "allow... a payment order from [the] payment account" nor gave a payment order, which is required to meet the definition for a "payer" under Directive Article 4(7)".
Another peculiarity of the mandates to pay behind each credit card transactions is that they are part of a larger group of consecutive transactions, performed identically but involving different monetary values and different suppliers/beneficiaries. The master card contract is ideal for large group of single deals. The anticipation of a complex contractual program and the simplification of the subsequent card operations are very appealing to the users and encourage future payments.
The legal fragmentation of a single economic card payment operation is a "magic formula" that helps to explain the impressive expansion of electronic payments operations in the last decades. Its complete understanding by the legislator and the interpreter is a crucial factor for the effectiveness of European protective measures on the electronic payments market.
